Governing Migration & Urbanisation in South African Municipalities: Developing Approaches to Counter Poverty and Social Fragmentation

Written by Loren B. Landau and Aurelia Segatti with Jean Pierre Misago
Editorial from Seana Nkhahle, Nomusa Ngwenya, and Tamlyn Monson

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175 Menlyn Corporate Park, Corner Garsfontein & Corroby Road, Menlyn, 0181, South Africa

PO Box 2094, Pretoria, 0001

Tel: (+27) 12 369 8000
Fax: (+27) 12 369 8100
Email: www.salga.org.za

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<tr>
<td>ACMS</td>
<td>African Centre for Migration and Society, Wits University</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ATTP</td>
<td>Assistance to the Poor</td>
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<td>CDW</td>
<td>Community Development Worker</td>
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<td>CoGTA</td>
<td>Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Home Affairs</td>
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<td>DPLG</td>
<td>Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
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<td>DPSA</td>
<td>Department of Public Service and Administration</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Deficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Sciences Research Council</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Planning</td>
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<td>IRD</td>
<td>Institute of Research for Development</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Johannesburg Migrants’ Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>LGES</td>
<td>Local Government Equitable Share</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
<td>Member of the Executive Committee</td>
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<td>MMC</td>
<td>Member of the Mayoral Committee</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PSPPD</td>
<td>Programme to Support Pro-poor Policy Development</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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Given its geographic scope and thematic focus, the conceptualisation, data collection and drafting of this report has drawn on a broad network of researchers, collaborators, officials, and residents of communities across South Africa. Most of the fieldwork for this report was conducted by a team of researchers coordinated by the African Centre for Migration and Society (formerly the Forced Migration Studies Programme) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. The team included Kathryn Takabvirwa, Mpapa Kanyane, Nomusa Ngwenya, and Guguletu Siziba. Jean-Pierre Misago led the team and provided the lead authors with the synthetic case reports on which much of this report is based. The report also draws on work by Saskia Greyling, Netsai Matshaka, Ncedo Mngqibisa, and Boipelo Moagaesi. Veronique Gindrey provided invaluable assistance in conceptualising the research and conducting much of the statistical analysis included here.

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Executive Summary

Developmental local government enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and the White Paper on Local Government empower municipalities to be a leading force for development. Municipal authorities have nevertheless been wary of addressing population movements and acknowledging human mobility as a fundamental driver of or response to development. Rather than take a proactive approach that plans for mobility in all of its forms, South African local authorities have typically been unable to address challenges related to migration, including inter-group conflict, economic marginalisation, and the inability to access suitable services. Yet failing to meet the very real challenges of domestic and international migration creates the risk of increasing conflict, violence, poverty and social exclusion in ways that negatively affect all urban residents. While local authorities and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) have begun to recognise the importance of mobility for the rights and welfare of all residents, municipalities still face numerous obstacles in creating inclusive and equitable communities. Building on almost a year of original research across South Africa, the following pages outline some of the major issues preventing local government from promoting the wellbeing of all residents and migrants, regardless of nationality or legal status, in South African municipalities.

The Scope and Limitations of Municipal Responsibility

Municipalities in South Africa are constitutionally assigned a primary role of providing basic services to communities, regardless of race, gender, and origin. National or provincial governments are responsible for the primary needs of migrants, such as access to shelter, health care, education, and economic opportunities; safety and security – including proper treatment in detention; and administrative justice. Despite this, under Section 153(a) of the Constitution, municipalities have a responsibility to ‘structure and manage its administration, budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of their communities and to promote the social and economic development of the community.’ In this regard, the ‘integrated development planning’ (IDP) process must be used as a tool to plan future development in a way that integrates the efforts of all spheres of government as well as other non-state stakeholders.

The success of municipalities depends on authorities’ ability to develop and respond to a nuanced and dynamic understanding of their constituencies. Due to a range of factors, including poor data collection and analysis, few municipalities are able to do so. Indeed, one of the most fundamental challenges to local government in protecting the rights and welfare of migrants and other residents is how little municipalities know about the people living in their areas of jurisdiction. There is a lack of information about the urban poor generally, and even less about geographically mobile people. To some extent, larger municipalities have been able to develop their own research departments and monitoring systems. Smaller municipalities continue to struggle to make sense of their communities’ population dynamics.

Although high quality data are often absent, there is widespread recognition of the value that improved data collection, research and analysis could offer to municipal planners and managers. However, one of the major obstacles to improving data collection and management emerges from a degree of confusion over who collects and manages data. As such, municipal planning departments typically act as a mere interface with Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), but often cannot extrapolate from it and have no capacity to conduct research themselves if there is a need for updated or more localised data. In addition, the current capacities and data processes in municipalities limit the ability of municipal practitioners and leaders to use the data in planning
and decision making. Without a proactive perspective on what can be done to address human mobility, the common refrain – ‘We can’t cope with this influx of people!’ – threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Perceptions and Capacity
Across South Africa, officials continue to react to foreign and domestic migrants by implicitly denying their presence, excluding them from developmental plans, or tacitly condoning discrimination throughout the government bureaucracy and police. Migrants are members of the community entitled to government resources, and are potential resources for communities, but in many cases, government officials see them as an illegitimate drain on public resources. In some municipalities, there is a distinct sense that current residents or ‘ratepayers’ deserve to be privileged over new arrivals or temporary residents. In others, officials hold fast to the idea that migration worsens violent crime, disease, and unemployment. Still others insist that matters related to migration and human mobility are exclusively the responsibility of national government. These perceptions place migrants outside of the local government constituency, preventing officials from adopting pragmatic policies to address their developmental impact and provide for their needs.

Staffing, transitions, and coordination within municipalities have also limited local authorities’ ability to develop appropriate frameworks. In some municipalities, leadership and staff turnovers have resulted in the redeployment of staff into positions where they do not have adequate technical background or knowledge to manage migration and urbanisation. The rapid turnover within some municipalities has also resulted in the loss of institutional knowledge that could provide important insights into municipal population dynamics. Perhaps most critically, different departments or divisions within local government often disagree over the validity of data or ongoing population dynamics. Often these disagreements are tied to broader concerns about performance targets and evaluation. Consequently, even where relatively accurate data exist, they may be selectively ignored by officials.

Consultation, Planning and Budgeting Processes
Participatory planning emerged in the post-apartheid dispensation as a way of realising democratic transformation at the local level. It currently constitutes the basis for the preparation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), five-year plans which flag the main directions for municipalities to attain the development goals they have set for themselves. While laudable on many grounds, the emphasis on participatory planning has created incentives for excluding the interests of migrants and discouraging officials from considering them in forward planning. In some instances, these processes have created ‘backward-looking programming,’ a situation in which planning represents the prior needs of the specific section of the current poor population that has accessed consultation forums. Communities rarely push for plans that consider demographic trends but instead ask that existing needs be met. Indeed, few communities ask that municipalities dedicate resources to future, potential residents over their own acute sense of need. Given negative public attitudes towards migrants, officials are unlikely to insist that resources be dedicated to unwanted future residents, especially when they are equipped with only a limited knowledge of migration dynamics.

This bias against planning for migration issues is cemented by the de facto exclusion of migrants, both domestic and international, from public planning consultations. In the areas visited for this study, outsiders were generally not invited to participate in Community Policing Forums, Stakeholders’ Forums, Residents’ Associations, or meetings held by local ward councillors. While participation was not necessarily prohibited – as anecdotal reports have claimed in some municipalities – the vast majority of government and community respondents reported a glaring absence of foreigners and recent domestic migrants in such fora. That said some positive steps have been taken to promote migrant participation. The City of Johannesburg, for instance,
has launched a number of initiatives to foster and encourage migrants’ participation in dialogue platforms and other activities at the ward level. These include the Migrant Help Desk, created in April 2007, and the Johannesburg Migrants’ Advisory Committee (JMAC), created in 2010. However, it is yet unclear how these initiatives will incorporate migrants into local-level planning given the prevalence of community-level exclusion mechanisms.

The pitfalls in planning that result from exclusion are perpetuated at the level of budgeting. While both sending and receiving communities are influenced by the costs and benefits associated with migration, population dynamics are rarely factored into the distribution of national resources by the National Treasury. Budgeting processes perpetuate the shortfalls of planning in the following ways:

1. Backward-looking planning for the needs of permanent residents leads financial planners to generally overlook population and migration trends, despite the fact that future residents will ultimately demand resources and interventions.

2. If significant efforts were made to ‘forward plan’, they would be largely unsupported by the current system of resource allocation to local government (Local Government Equitable Share – LGES).

3. The planning and budgeting modalities generally reflect a limited capacity to cater for the poor in general and, in particular, the most indigent sections of the population.

Intergovernmental Coordination on Planning and Service Delivery

Municipal authorities are often frustrated by the relationships between municipalities and other spheres of government. At the heart of this discontent we find the issue of mandates and the purported monopolistic tendencies of other spheres of government. Recent research by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs confirms that municipalities often feel – in many cases justifiably – that failures in national and provincial government policies and processes undermine their credibility and effectiveness. It also finds that the system of intergovernmental relations is not effective in coordinating planning across the three spheres of government, or in strengthening accountability towards achieving critical and targeted development outcomes.

These findings support two challenges that CoGTA has already identified. First, they highlight the problem of ‘intergovernmental conflict and competition over powers and functions between provinces and their local governments.’ Second, they confirm that ‘national targets for service delivery that apply uniformly irrespective of the economic and institutional differences between municipalities simply set municipalities up to fail.’ This report points in addition to a series of more specific frustrations and tensions regarding:

- The absence of consultation of local government structures in national migration policy-making;
- The lack of clarity on roles of the different levels of government (provincial and local in particular) across various sectors;
- A perception of exclusion from planning and budgeting processes;
- Frustration with shifting priorities and goalposts (in terms of service provision to the poor in particular); and
- In the changing of policies and practices regarding immigrants and asylum seekers (including relocating offices, lifting work prohibitions, and formally enabling access to services) without consultation with or forewarning to local authorities.

Although municipal authorities are often frustrated at not being consulted on issues related to the populations they are responsible for, this study finds that municipalities were rarely proactive advocates for their populations. Many blamed the hegemony of party structures for closing avenues for ‘upward’ communication. Regardless of the reason, there appear to be few leadership initiatives in terms of lobbying for either an
individual or a collective rethink of the LGES or other policy issues directly affecting municipalities’ ability to address population dynamics.

**Recommendations**

Failure to manage migration is yielding undesired consequences for all residents of South Africa. However, when properly managed, domestic migration can bring people closer to services, enrich the labour market, and open important opportunities for reducing poverty and promoting social cohesion. Similarly, international migration need not lead to conflict and tensions, but can help to provide much-needed skills and entrepreneurial energy, at the same time boosting regional trade and integration, and helping to facilitate post-conflict reconstruction in countries of origin. The following recommendations are intended to help achieve those ends.

**Data Collection and Management**

There is a need to rethink the data collection system and interface between municipalities, StatsSA and other data collection agencies, to ensure that:

- The National Statistical Agency collects data which is disaggregated better at the local level. This should include better coordination with municipalities and other data collection agencies.
- Data collection methods at municipal level are agreed upon, familiar, and considered to be legitimate, useful and reliable by all stakeholders. A degree of standardisation at national and municipal level may be required to allow comparability.
- Data builds up into longitudinal databases informing municipalities’ on trends over time to better predict population changes, dependency ratios, and areas for social and infrastructure investment. This data is then aggregated at multiple levels and incorporated into municipal, district, provincial and national planning strategies.
- Those assigned to engage with migrants or plan in areas affected by population mobility should have training on data management, use of the data, and various migration related issues.

**Use of Data in Policy, Planning and Budgeting**

- Mainstream population (including migration) dynamics into IDPs (social cohesion, economic growth, safety and security), and cater for highly mobile populations wherever necessary.
- Include spatial planning tools to facilitate the use of population data for policy and planning.
- Review budgeting processes including the Local Government Equitable Share Allocation to include forward-looking population dynamics. Ensure that Local Government Equitable Share allows for more regular population re-assessments (including indigent population) and correct effects on revenue allocation.

**Improved Coordination**

- Improve co-ordination of all relevant partners at national, provincial and local levels towards a more effective management of migration. These include all spheres of government, civil society, private sector, research agencies, and academic institutions. Facilitate the institutionalisation of the local government response to migration in order to improve communication and coordination between municipalities and migrant communities. This would need to include the establishment of dedicated capacity to deal with migration, such as a migrant desk in each municipality.
- Establish closer relations with researchers and data analysts to assist in the rethinking of decision making and implementation mandates with regard to mobile populations. Such collaboration may take the form of a migration ‘think tank’.
Migration Policy and Border Management

- South Africa needs an immigration policy that promotes its goals of regional integration, counter-poverty, social justice and human rights. This means developing appropriate means for people to enter the country legally and with appropriate documentation. Considering that South Africa, like all other migrant receiving countries, cannot completely seal its borders, it must find ways to manage cross-border mobility in ways that are humane and promote the legal migration of people who wish to cross.
- If improved regulation of the labour market is required, the government should consider sanctions against employers who violate immigration and labour laws and more regularly inspection of workplaces to ensure that the basic conditions of labour are being upheld.
- Reforms in migration policy should be carried out in collaboration with municipalities. Municipalities should also find ways of formulating and articulating their interests with regard to immigration policy and practice.

Continuous Research and Development

Support ongoing research to enhance the understanding and management of migration. The following additional areas of research have been proposed

- Migration and access to services in order to better understand how (if at all) long-term vulnerable groups move out of poverty.
- Qualitative research to determine the relationships between mobility within or between cities and access to employment, labour and services;
- Qualitative studies on the role played by corporate social responsibility programmes carried out by companies relying on migrant labour.
Chapter One: Introduction and Framing

Constitutionally empowered to be a leading force for development, municipal authorities have nevertheless been wary of addressing population movements or acknowledging human mobility as a fundamental driver of or response to development. This reluctance partially stems from a belief among many policy makers (local and national), that immigration and migration are exclusively matters of national policy concern. Others have unrealistically hoped that heightened human mobility was merely a temporary outgrowth of the country’s democratic transition. In many instances, authorities have feared that developing proactive, positive responses to migration would only encourage more of it. For these and other reasons, budgeting and planning exercises have been conducted with little reference to extended population projections or other insights into the relationships among mobility, livelihoods, and community development. As the population continues to move, the shortcomings of these planning exercises and interventions have become increasingly evident in terms of limited access to critical services, physical and economic insecurity, marginalisation, and social conflict.

In 2009, the South African Local Government Association’s (SALGA) National Executive Committee resolved to undertake a study dedicated to understanding the nature, magnitude and implications of migration for municipal governance and planning. This resolution stemmed from a growing recognition that migration in all its forms raises significant challenges and opportunities for local government. South Africa is a country on the move, and as a result, mobility is something local authorities simply cannot ignore.

This report presents the findings of a research project titled ‘Governing Migration and Urbanisation in South African Municipalities: Developing Approaches to Counter Poverty and Social Fragmentation.’ It was conducted as a partnership between the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) and the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. The aim of the study was to identify the role that municipalities can play in managing migration at local government level to promote social cohesion and counter social exclusion and poverty.

Initial study findings were presented to the Portfolio Committee on Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) at the National Assembly in October 2009. The committee agreed that it had to do more to highlight the challenges of migration and urbanisation and to ensure that they remain on the developmental agenda. The consensus was that this would in turn ensure that the issues were addressed by all relevant stakeholders.

Additional findings were presented at a SALGA National Members Assembly (NMA) in May 2010. The assembly resolved that SALGA should facilitate partnerships to enhance data and information relating to migration. A SALGA National Executive Committee (NEC) Policy Workshop held in August 2010 adopted the study recommendations as a SALGA position that would be used to lobby and advocate on behalf of municipalities at various targeted forums. It was also proposed that:

- South Africa’s approach to the issue of migration needs to consider the local, national, regional and global context of migration (note that there is a discussion addressing the management of community heterogeneity at the local level further on in this chapter);
- A migration policy framework should be seen as a tool for strategic development, rather than being viewed as a negative issue that needs to be reversed.
- Urbanisation is a global phenomenon with specific local effects. As such, it must be factored into policy and planning processes at all levels in order for it to be effectively managed. This includes managing the interface and relationships between urban and rural municipalities.
Population data should be used across a range of socio-economic and spatial planning exercises. These include, among others; Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), Spatial Development Frameworks (SDFs), land-use management tools, and infrastructure plans.

An effective response to human mobility and poverty reduction requires the ongoing cooperation of all relevant partners, including, among others, civil society, faith-based institutions, the private sector, research agencies and academic institutions.

Local government responses to migration must be supported by improved communication between municipalities and migrant communities (for example, municipalities may consider the establishment of migrant desks or other inclusive means of engagement).

The country’s migration policies, including border management, should promote the documentation and safe movement of all migrants entering South Africa. This would enable municipalities to better account for migrants, to plan, and to clarify their respective responsibilities. Similarly, public services, including health, education, and housing, must reform their delivery models to better account for people moving within the country.

Finally, the study findings were presented at the 15th International Metropolis Conference at The Hague, Netherlands, in October 2010. Drawing together researchers from over 80 countries, the delegates explored various means and mechanisms for accommodating diversity and mobility in cities around the world.

Approaching Migration

Overturning the restrictions of the past, South Africa’s approach to internal migration in the post-apartheid period has guaranteed freedom of movement to all. Domestic migrants are allowed to access economies, enjoy critical social and financial services, and live anywhere without fear of violence and abuse – although, of course, such access is not always realised in practice. The country’s approach to international migration is somewhat more ambiguous. Many international migrants are unable to enter, live, and work in South Africa. While refugees and asylum seekers are able to claim a limited bouquet of rights, the vast majority of migrants, almost 85% of whom are from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), are in the country without valid immigration documents although a small number enter with work, business, and study permits. The constitution protects many fundamental rights regardless of immigration status. These include rights to due legal process, life-saving medical care, and basic labour protections. However more still needs to be done to consolidate and build on these rights. In this light, a pro-active response to migration and human mobility becomes increasingly significant.

As people move to various destinations within the country, they require services that will enable them to lead a normal life. Roux (2009) argues that ‘the ability of refugees and asylum seekers to secure such social and economic rights is particularly complex in countries like South Africa, that face challenges in providing these rights to their own nationals.’ The same could be said for other categories of domestic and international migrants. Indeed, both foreign and domestic migration has implications for the host community, and they require different sets of interventions. The need for improved governance systems is particularly acute in the country’s major urban centres, which are the focus of both domestic and international migration. As the sphere of government directly responsible for urban management, local government is mandated to develop specific interventions to address and manage the associated challenges.

The Local Management of Migration: Policy Frameworks and Effects

Municipalities in South Africa are constitutionally assigned a primary role of providing basic services to their communities. Many local government competencies relate to services that are vital for day-to-day survival, such as disaster response, water and sanitation, waste removal, and electricity and gas reticulation. Others
are crucial for social and economic productivity, including local amenities, parks and sports facilities, municipal roads and public transport, street lighting, and the regulation of street trading. Municipalities are required to use ‘integrated development planning’ as a tool to plan future development in their areas.

Local government has a critical role in shaping the developmental impacts of mobility. However, many of the social and economic challenges associated with human movement are not explicitly within local government’s constitutional mandate. The primary needs of migrants – such as access to shelter, health care, education, and economic opportunities; safety and security, including proper treatment in detention; and administrative justice – are largely the responsibility of national or provincial governments. That said, a local municipality does, under Section 153(a) of the Constitution, have a responsibility to ‘structure and manage its administration, budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of their communities and to promote the social and economic development of the community.’

Section 152(1) also outlines local authorities’ ‘developmental duty’ to promote ‘social and economic development’ and ‘a safe and healthy environment’, as well as fulfilling other responsibilities that clearly suggest some responsibility regarding human mobility. This comes through more clearly in the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, which argues that the challenge for local government is not ‘how to run a set of services’, but how to ‘transform and manage settlements’ that are amongst the most distorted, complex and dynamic in the world. The White Paper proposes that this bigger challenge can only be grasped if municipalities think of themselves as ‘developmental local government.’ In this regard, municipal authorities certainly have a role – albeit ill-defined – in addressing human mobility.

Migration poses a number of challenges and opportunities to municipalities in fulfilling their mandates. There is, however, limited guidance on how to address these in a progressive and mutually beneficial way. Most local authorities have thus far not developed empirically informed and proactive policy responses to domestic and foreign migration. Many officials continue to react to foreign and domestic migrants by implicitly denying their presence, excluding them from developmental plans, or tacitly condoning discrimination that exists throughout the government bureaucracy and police. In many cases, migrants continue to be seen primarily as a drain on public resources, rather than as citizens of the community that local government must serve – or indeed potential resources. Even for those who yearn for more proactive means of absorbing new, poor and vulnerable populations, there are considerable challenges in determining how to proceed. This report is intended to assist local government and its key partners in this regard, providing a step towards a better understanding and improved management of migration.

**Profiling Migration in South African Municipalities**

To plan, drive and monitor progress towards the integrated equitable development envisaged by government, municipalities require readily available, accurate and up-to-date demographic data. One of the most fundamental challenges to local government is how little municipalities know about the people living in their communities. While national government is responsible for developing national strategic plans and general policy frameworks, local government is responsible for more focused and context-specific interventions. Due to poor data, municipalities are often unable to draw on a nuanced and dynamic understanding of their constituencies. This is generally true regarding the urban poor, and all the more so with regard to geographically mobile people. Efforts to map ‘poverty pockets’ (Cross, et al, 2005) and review both foreign and domestic migration data (Dorrington 2005; Bekker 2002; Kok and Collinson 2006; SACN 2006; Landau and Gindrey 2008), represent some of the concerted efforts to understand South Africa’s urban population dynamics. However, many of these studies are based on admittedly incomplete census data. This data is particularly inaccurate regarding foreign-born populations and is often purely descriptive. Nevertheless, these data are the best available and must serve as the basis for local and national planning.
While the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) recognises that there is a need to improve cross-border and multi-nodal planning – including a greater consideration of population mobility, planners are effectively unable to understand the functional economic geography of the city and its region, and how the different components relate to each other. In this context, local planners continue to be influenced by stereotypes and misreading of data. These often include the perception that increased population necessarily translates into competition for existing resources.

The inability to effectively understand and predict urban populations poses significant risks to local governments’ ability to meet their obligations and developmental objectives. Perhaps most obviously, the invisibility of large segments of the population, including domestic and international migrants, can result in much greater demand for services than predicted, reducing service quality and outstripping budgetary allocations. In many instances, there are hidden costs to public and private infrastructure, water, and other services that are not accessed individually. The degradation of building stock due to high population densities – which is a consequence of new migrants minimising costs while maximising centrality also has long-term cost implications for cities that collect taxes on the basis of building values. In addition, health and safety are severely compromised in areas where densification is inadequately managed.

As many of South Africa’s internal migrants are young – and therefore likely to remain relatively healthy, independent and productive – a growing population does not inevitably result in skyrocketing costs to the local government in an urban receiving community. However, sending communities may lose the benefits of young people’s labour, while having to bear the costs of educating the children they leave behind, as well as providing for returning migrants when they become too old or ill to work.

To provide an empirical basis for addressing the real and imagined challenges of human mobility, this report documents migration into and out of South Africa’s municipalities. Movements at this level are far more frequent than at the national or provincial levels and directly influence the work of local authorities. Although this report does include specific discussions of international migration, movement within and between provinces is numerically more important and raises more fundamental challenges to municipal governance throughout South Africa.

Urbanisation has become a major challenge over the last century. In the 1950s, 30% of the world population lived in urban areas. By 2005, this proportion had grown to 49%. As of 2008, more than half of the world’s population lived in urban areas. By the middle of the current century, most regions of the developing world will be predominantly urban. This growth, which includes both natural growth and migration, suggests that there are five million new urban residents every month. Poor cities are growing much faster than rich cities. The annual rate of urban population change reached 3.4% per year in the less developed regions during the period 1975-2005 – as compared to 0.8% in the more developed regions. In future, the growth rate will continue to be particularly rapid in the urban areas of the less developed regions, averaging 2.2% per year during the period 2005-2030. In contrast, the urban population in the more developed countries is projected to grow at an annual rate of only 0.5%.

After the South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the country’s previously ‘forbidden cities’ became primary destinations for migrants from around the country, across the continent, and beyond. Population movements – some predictable, some spontaneous; some voluntary, some forced – are now perennial, if not always welcome, features of South African Cities (SACN 2004:36; Balbo and Marconi 2005; Bekker 2002; Dorrington 2005). Domestic migration in South Africa has been structured by a history of displacement as well as more voluntary forms of mobility. The forced removals of people from certain areas, and the establishment
of townships such as Soweto in the 1950s and Soshanguve in the 1970s, has structured both the population’s
distribution and many of the migration patterns we see today. To some extent, the growth of informal settlements
and cities is the result of a ‘correction’ in which people moved where they would already have been were it
not for apartheid-era segregation. However, we must recognise that some of the most dominant patterns of
mobility are rural to rural, and movements into small towns. StatsSA maintains that population migration within
South Africa has been reasonably constant at around 12% of the population for each five-year period it has
investigated, namely 1975-1980, 1992-1996, and 1996-2001. We are also likely to see continued movement
(though not necessarily permanent settlement) as people continue to maintain translocal livelihoods or continue
moving in search of opportunities. To make sense of mobility, we need to view its dynamics and impacts at the
national, sub-provincial and household level (StatsSA, 2006).

International and internal Migration
The 2001 census led to initial estimates of around 330,000 foreign nationals living in South Africa. This figure
was later revised up to close to a million after correcting for sampling errors. Despite this increase, the total is
still far below what many presume. Projections from this data (taking into account the increased arrivals from
Zimbabwe in recent years) suggest that the number of foreign nationals is now between 1.5 and 3.5 million
(StatsSA, 2007). Of foreign migrants residing in the country, 46.8% live in Gauteng, followed by 13.4% in
the Western Cape (StatsSA, 2007). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of recent international migration across
South Africa.
Although the numbers of foreign migrants are relatively small (around 3% of the country’s population), their experiences and activities in South Africa can have a significant impact on the country’s development trajectory and efforts to counter poverty. On the positive side, they bring much-needed skills (for instance, to the education, health, and engineering sectors, in addition to entrepreneurial activities). They also provide a level of flexibility to the labour market. Although there is little evidence of systematic wage suppression or job replacement, there are indications that international migrants do compete directly with South Africans for positions in certain sites at particular times (see Misago 2009). The perception of widespread job competition, together with the erroneous belief that foreigners drain fiscal resources, has contributed to tensions between citizens and non-nationals, when in fact only an insignificant number of non-nationals are able to access state-supported grants or social services. The xenophobic attacks that erupted in May 2008 are an extreme example of migration-related tensions and resultant conflict (See Misago, et al, 2008).

Information about movements into and out of South African municipalities is critical in order to begin addressing a number of planning and governance challenges presented by migration. The table below demonstrates movement between provinces. Unfortunately there is not enough data disaggregated to a municipal level. However, the existing data on proportions of population growth and internal migration per district municipality are provided further on in this section.

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1 This map reflects the most recent national data (2001). While the 2007 community survey provides general trends, the sample is too small to provide a detailed spatial analysis.
Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Non-migrants and Migrants Based on Place of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% of residents population born in the province</th>
<th>% of residents immigrants (residents population not born in the province)</th>
<th>% of out-migrants (population born in the province but residing elsewhere)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape (EC)</td>
<td>93,4</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>23,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State (FS)</td>
<td>85,6</td>
<td>14,4</td>
<td>21,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng (GP)</td>
<td>58,1</td>
<td>41,9</td>
<td>15,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)</td>
<td>93,5</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>9,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>93,6</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>22,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga (MP)</td>
<td>76,3</td>
<td>23,7</td>
<td>20,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape (NC)</td>
<td>84,4</td>
<td>15,6</td>
<td>29,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West (NW)</td>
<td>76,9</td>
<td>23,1</td>
<td>16,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape (WC)</td>
<td>71,7</td>
<td>28,3</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007

Table 2: Matrix of Origin of Migrants between Provinces 2001-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination Province</th>
<th>Percent from Province of Origin</th>
<th>All Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape (WC)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape (EC)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape (NC)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State (FS)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest (NW)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng (GP)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga (MP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo (LP)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: StatsSA, Community Survey 2007
The tables above show internal migrants based on province of birth and province of usual residence. Proportionally, Gauteng received the most migrants, followed by the Western Cape. The provinces that received the lowest proportions of migrants were the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo, where between 6% and 7% of the resident population were born in other provinces. Northern Cape has the highest percentage of out-migrants (29.3%). StatsSA provides no indication of migrants’ destinations within the provinces as it only considers migration when it crosses provincial boundaries. This poses a challenge to municipalities, which are required to host and plan for migrant communities. The figures below reflect these migration patterns in visual terms.

The main source of information for the analyses in figure 2 (above) and figure 3 (on the next page) is the Community Survey conducted in 2007 by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA). Conducted in lieu of a national census, it contains a representative sample (N=1,047,652) of South Africa’s population. Once weighted according to StatsSA’s recommendations, a relatively precise analysis of the migration patterns across the country’s municipalities is made. To heighten accuracy, municipalities where less than 2,000 persons were interviewed in the Community Survey are excluded. This means that 66 of the country’s less populated municipalities, and 22 management areas, are not considered. Nonetheless, the data do provide a good degree of confidence about the municipalities included here.

Figure 2: Percentage of Internal Migrants by District Municipalities

Source: StatsSA 10% sample of 2001 census.
At the sub-provincial level, small towns have emerged as key development nodes. Women, in particular, are on the move, taking families out of the rural villages to small nearby towns. The pattern of movement of villagers to small towns differs from migration between the rural village and metropolitan areas. Migration to small towns appears to be more permanent, whereas, at least in some cases, migration to metropolitan areas is more temporary, with people moving from rural to urban, and back to rural. Household-level analysis highlights the prevalence of temporary migration as an individual and household strategy linking rural areas with larger settlements. The Agincourt study shows remarkably high levels of temporary migration among rural men, with the trend among rural women rising. Migrants stay in touch with their rural households, usually remitting money or goods, and are likely to return to rural areas on retirement or retrenchment.

Some officials within local government have seen increasing migration and diversity as a hugely positive sign of South African cities’ emergence as trading and cultural centres. In response, city planners in both Johannesburg and Cape Town have begun outlining strategies for recruiting and incorporating highly skilled migrants and refugees into the city’s socio-economic networks. However, it is also evident that many of the cities’ leaders and citizens feel overwhelmed by migration, both international and domestic. In other places, the out-migration of the cities’ skilled and affluent is raising

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2 In 2005, Cape Town conducted a skills audit of its refugee population so as to better develop policies to capitalise on their presence in the city. Johannesburg has yet to follow suit but has recently officially recognised the potential contributions migrants make to the city.
the spectre of economic decline and an ever-expanding underclass (SACN 2006). Many people working within government believe that migration is linked to the expansion of drug syndicates, prostitution, human trafficking, and crime more generally. Migration is also imagined to result in rising unemployment and a range of other social and economic ills. Apart from a few exceptional cases, elected officials sense that urbanisation and international migration raise the spectre of economic and political fragmentation and urban degeneration (see Beal, et al, 2003). Some municipalities have taken steps to address these concerns. These are valiant efforts but often are inadequate, or premised on an incomplete understanding of the problems they seek to address.

Research Methodology
Developing a sound response to human mobility in South African municipalities not only requires an understanding of migration dynamics, but also a review of current approaches to address them. To that end, this project conducted intensive, primary research in a sample of four South African municipalities: Nelson Mandela Bay, Mossel Bay, Tshwane, and Merafong. At each site, a four-person research team conducted individual and focus group interviews with municipal officials, law enforcement officials, community leaders, representatives of political parties and labour unions, and representatives of the business sector, NGOs and community organisations. The primary fieldwork was conducted between March and June 2010. The brevity of the research period meant that the team spent approximately two weeks in each municipality. Given the limited time and the focus of this initiative, the emphasis during this period was placed on attitudes and accounts of practice rather than deep observation of institutional culture, population dynamics, or political configurations. The current report draws on the original fieldwork, coupled with the findings of long-term research in Johannesburg and Cape Town, and a review of previously published materials.

Selecting Municipalities for Research
Selection of the four municipalities sampled for primary research was based on a range of indicators. These indicators are laid out below. We subsequently explain how pairs of municipalities were selected according to their relation to the indicators.

Percentage of recent migrants
A locality’s population changes due to births, deaths and migration (inward and outward). Spatial changes may also occur due to movements within a given municipality. Tracking these variables is necessary to understand the dynamics and ultimately to project the population of a municipality. However, existing data only allows for a limited understanding of these patterns, making migration at the municipal level particularly difficult to measure. A few countries, particularly those in Northern Europe, try to maintain population registers to map their populations’ distribution and mobility. Although providing some useful data, these registers remain relatively inaccurate; as inhabitants have little incentive to register and do not regularly declare their moves. In South Africa, the only option is to infer from the 2001 census and the 2007 community survey by StatsSA. Respondents’ municipality of prior residence was collected but ultimately not encoded by StatsSA. Therefore, it is impossible to trace municipalities of origin and ascertain whether migrants within a single province relocated between municipalities or within a single municipality. This gap in the data is likely to be particularly pronounced where a single primary city tends to attract considerable migration from within the Province (such as Nelspruit in Mpumalanga, or Durban in KwaZulu-Natal). It is also worth noting that people who have emigrated (i.e. left the country) are totally omitted by the national surveys and effectively disappear from data on the South African citizenry. Due to these and other limitations, when measuring the percentage of recent migrants for selection purposes, we could consider only the percentage of internal or international migrants who were living outside of their current province or the country five years before the StatsSA research was conducted.
Human Development

Building on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human Development Index (HDI), we developed an index combining information on health, education, and income. More specifically, this indicator included:

- Life expectancy at the municipal level was estimated with an arithmetic average of the life expectancy in each municipality. Although life expectancy dropped by 10 years on average between 1996 and 2007, the selection is premised on the assumption that the differentials between the municipalities remain unchanged on the period.

- In the UNDP’s definition, the educational attainment index is based on information on adult literacy and the enrolment ratio. As there is no information on adult literacy at the municipal level, the education index is based on the information on enrolment figures included in the 2007 Community Survey. For each municipality, the number of students enrolled in primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education were divided, regardless of age, by the number of persons of theoretical school age for the three levels (ages between 6 and 24).

- The standard of living income is measured in the UNDP index by GDP per capita. At the municipal level, the sum of all the income declared by the inhabitants in the 2007 Community Survey, divided by the population of the municipality, was used as an approximation of the GDP per capita. (Note, though, that the municipality where the value was created can be different from the municipality where the recipient of the income lives).

To get an index comprised between 0 and 1, each component of the index, and the index itself, is calculated using the following formula:

\[
\text{Index} = \frac{\text{actual value} - \text{minimum value}}{\text{maximum value} - \text{minimum value}}
\]

Equal weights are allocated to the three components. The final index is an arithmetic average of the three components turned into an index. Although these are imperfect indicators, they are applied consistently across the municipalities. As such, they provide a strong tool for ranking the human development levels.
The final index was an arithmetic average of the three components, equally weighted, and turned into an index. Although these are imperfect indicators, they are applied consistently across the municipalities. As such, they provide a strong tool for ranking the human development levels.

**Recent migrants’ relative productivity**
To analyse the interaction between migrants and host communities, the median income generated by recent migrants is compared with the median income generated by locals. The calculations are based on the whole migrant or non-migrant populations generating or not generating an income. Local or migrant children are included in the calculation as they rely on the local or migrant population.

**Occurrence of xenophobic violence in and around May 2008**
The occurrence of xenophobic violence is based on the Forced Migration Studies Programme’s review of information collected from media reports and other reporting mechanisms. Ideally, this database should be expanded to include other incidents of violence that may have an outsider/insider dynamic.

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3 Internal or international migrants who were living outside of the province in 2001.
4 The non-migrant population includes persons who were living in the same province in 2001, even if they moved from another municipality.
The Sampled Municipalities

Two pairs of municipalities were chosen according to the four criteria defined above. The first pair comprising of Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay comprised municipalities with high and very similar proportions of recent migrants, and different HDI scores (see Figure 4). This selection was made with the aim of exploring the ways in which municipalities accommodate similar new populations according to their respective capacities and socio-economic environment. The focus here is on municipalities with a high migration rate, as they have a higher imperative to plan their growth – to project needs for housing, infrastructure, and service delivery for example. These needs are immediate when migration occurs, unlike the case of municipalities where growth is mainly natural, and where population needs are predictable and develop over time. More than 8% of the population of each of this first pair of municipalities is composed of recent migrants who were living in another province or country five years earlier.

Figure 5: South African Municipalities by Percentage of Recent Migrants and Human Development Index score

The second pair, consisting of Mossel Bay and Merafong, includes two municipalities where recent migrants are the most or least successful according to the recent migrants’ relative productivity defined above. This index does not speak to the cause of the success, but nonetheless captures something important about the migration experience. If one presumes that in many cases migration is part of an economic improvement strategy this is an important indicator of the degree to which new arrivals are integrated into local economies and service provision networks. The municipalities are presented in Figure 5 according to their percentage


While most migration theories suggest that economic motivations are the primary driver of movement, it is worth noting that marriage is generally the reason most often cited for domestic migration.
of recent migrants and the communities’ position on the human development index. In addition to these two pairs, the authors draw on prior and secondary work on Cape Town and Johannesburg. The different context of the attacks should be striking enough to put into light the different dynamics at work behind it. Following this process, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela municipality were selected.

**Figure 6: South African Municipalities by Level of Recent Migrants’ Relative Productivity and Municipalities affected by Xenophobic Violence in May 2008**


- out of the study
- recent migrants have lower productivity than locals
- recent migrants have equal or higher (but less than twice) productivity than locals
- migrants have at least twice the locals’ productivity
- occurrence of xenophobic violence in 2008
Chapter Two: Population Data – Collection and Use

As noted in the introduction, one of the most fundamental challenges to local governments is how little they know about the populations they are responsible for governing. Local governments are responsible for focused and context-specific interventions, yet in only very few instances were officials from municipalities included in this study able to draw on a nuanced and dynamic understanding of their constituencies. This is not limited to the municipalities studied. Nor is it limited to issues of migration; it extends to local government’s understanding of the urban poor more generally.

As highlighted earlier, planners recognise the need for improved planning, but due to limited understanding of the nature and dynamics of the functional economic geography of their municipalities and regions (SACN 2006: Section 2-7), are often influenced by stereotypes or misinterpretations of the data that is available. This study systematically explored how municipal officials deal with population data collection, and how they use it in planning, and manage it over time. The findings highlight three central challenges:

- There is a tension between the widespread belief that additional population data is needed, and the incomplete, inconsistent and irregular use of what data is in fact available, sometimes due to the varied degree of legitimacy that data is assigned by different departments.
- Efforts to improve the capacity to collect, manage, and employ population data are significantly hindered by losses of knowledge due to staff turnover among leadership and administrators. In some instances, this has resulted in the appointment of people to positions for which they do not have the adequate technical background or knowledge. In others, it has resulted simply in the loss of institutional knowledge that could have provided important insights into municipal population dynamics.
- Municipal planners often have negative perceptions of population and mobility. In the case of domestic migration, these are often linked to various arguments around resource allocation and pressure on social services. With regard to international migrants, such beliefs often extend to include questions of crime, conflict, and moral degeneration.

More Population Data: But for What Use?

Sources and knowledge of existing data: a problematic interface between data stakeholders

Officials in all four case municipalities considered population data for planning, budgeting, and other municipal function, but they rarely prioritised its collection or analysis. Moreover, despite the evident desire for data, authorities widely acknowledged that it was remarkably scarce, incomplete, inaccurate, outdated, de-contextualised, and difficult to understand. As it now stands, municipalities draw population information and data from a wide range of sources including Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), independent demographic studies commissioned through consultants, academic research institutions, the internet, and service accounts. Municipalities generally do not have units or even staff members dedicated to collecting and managing population data or making existing data available for the use of their departments. Rather, directorates or departments use different sources of information, effectively operating in ‘information silos’ when programming and planning.

Part of the challenge associated with data collection and management emerges from a degree of confusion over who is mandated to collect and manage data. In one municipality, a senior official in the City Planning Department claimed his colleagues were in charge of measuring the population. However, the head of the Governance and Secretariat Unit in the same municipality denied the assertion and stated that the planning unit ‘has nothing to do with population information’. Such confusion was typical, and it is often unclear who should determine the statistical basis for assessments, evaluation and planning. Planning departments often
act as a mere interface with StatsSA, but have no capacity to conduct such research themselves and limited ability to assess or extrapolate from the information they receive. Despite a widespread recognition of the value improved data collection, research, and analysis could serve for municipal planners, it remains unclear who would make use of it, or how it would influence current planning within this context.

The current local and national structures for planning and budgeting mean that there are mixed incentives for collecting and using data in municipal decision making. Currently, StatsSA is the most commonly used source of data, largely because it is the only official data collection agency and the source used by decision makers in other spheres of government. The role of StatsSA is particularly important when deciding how financial support should be allocated to municipalities, particularly through Local Government Equitable Share (LGES). While the data has great political and financial importance, municipalities recognise that the information they employ is outdated, often inaccurate and generally misleading. This is one of the reasons why municipalities often commission their own demographic studies. Three municipalities in the research sample commissioned demographic studies at more or less the same time that Stats SA was conducting the nation-wide Community Survey (i.e., 2007). Before then, municipalities had relied on data from the 2001 Census. After the 2006 Local Government elections, with new administrations in place, many felt the need for some new, inter-census data that could reflect changes over the previous five years. As the 2007 Household Survey results were only expected to be available in 2008 at the earliest, they decided to commission work from consultants in the preparation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). Changes in data provision and poor intergovernmental communication also affected the way certain departments collect information and resulted in discontinuities. In one of the case studies, an official from the National Department of Primary Health reported miscommunication between this department, the Department of Home Affairs, and StatsSA, which prevented the adjustment of growth rate calculations from death and birth registration – something that had previously been possible.

While all municipalities had some form of an estimate of the population, only one did its own population data projections. In place of their own analysis, they either relied on updates provided by StatsSA or used a range of different, and often ad hoc, methods to update their population statistics. For instance, one municipality updates its population figures using the average national annual population growth; another used its own calculated average household size. Methodologies are extremely varied and range from satellite / aerial photographs to qualitative field studies. Although some of this may serve the respective municipalities well, their disparity precludes any comparative analysis – a serious obstacle to the understanding of trends at provincial, inter-provincial and inter-municipal levels. These various initiatives emerge from a lack of reliable data and, in their diversity, produce a range of conflicting information of varying reliability and utility.

The need for micro-local data: Population information at ward level

Although municipalities continue to use StatsSA data, its applicability is limited by issues of scale. Some of these concerns could be addressed through better engagement with StatsSA and other government departments, local skills development to analyse existing data, and extrapolation of data from other sources. Municipalities still need to ascertain spatially localised trends that are neither well captured by national aggregates nor extractable by officials. One Executive Director for Economic Development expressed his frustration by arguing that:

StatsSA collects data at ward level, but presents at provincial level, which makes its usage for planning difficult. We would need to spend a lot of money to get consultants to do additional analyses, to break it down to metro level.

7 Tshwane, Merafong, Nelson Mandela Metro
8 Note that the Nelson Mandela Bay projections are highly contested even internally by municipal departments.
Although StatsSA does provide census data, for instance at ward level, upon request, there is a widespread perception that such data are not available. Perhaps part of this stems from the lack of local level skills or ability to specify which data would be most useful for planning purposes.

Apart from StatsSA, municipalities can potentially call on local-level data generated by Community Development Workers (CDWs), who are part of a government programme created in 2004 and coordinated by all three spheres of government (Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA); Provincial Departments Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA); and municipalities). Where there is a good working relationship between the ward leadership and CDWs (for instance in some wards in Nelson Mandela Bay and Merafong), ward officials obtain population information from ward profiles regularly compiled by CDWs. Such data are not always available because, 1) not every ward has a CDW and, 2) CDWs (who are deployed by and report to the provincial government) are not always willing to share their reports with their respective ward leaderships. This unwillingness stems from an unclear relationship between provinces and municipalities over the management of these CDWs, who some see as provincials agents ‘spying’ on local leaders. This relationship seemed particularly tense in one of the smaller municipalities where CDWs who were interviewed acknowledged that a redefinition of their mandate should be planned for after the next local elections. Ward profiles are therefore very heterogeneous, and information is scarce. In addition, the methodologies used for ward profiling are unclear.

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9 Interview with CDWs in Merafong, 2 June 2010.
Box 1. Population information collected from municipal officials interviewed.

NB: Information collected and presented below shows the lack of an existing standard template for such information within municipalities. It also reflects inconsistencies and discrepancies.

### City of Tshwane
**Municipality information (Tshwane Household Survey July 2008)**
- **Population**: Between 2,345,908 & 2,428,185 inhabitants / 134,079 migrants (both domestic & foreign) in 2008
- **Foreigners**: 2.4% of the total population and 10.8% of migrants stock
- **Percentage increase for total population**: 22.5% (percentage increase from 2003-2008) of which 5.5% is due to migration
- **Households**: 713,407
- **Average household size**: 3.4

**2001-2007 Stats SA data**
- **Population**: 2,348,160 (2007 Community Survey)
- **Percentage increase (2001-2007)**: 18%
- **Percentage moved in the last 5 years (2002-2007)**: 9%
- **from another province or another country**
- **Recent migrants’ relative productivity**: 0.33
- **Households**: 686,640
- **Average household size**: 3.4

### Nelson Mandela Bay
**Municipality information (2006 Demographic Study)**
- **Population**: Around 1,100,000 in 2006; projection of 1,193,430 by 2010
- **Percentage increase**: 8.7% (2001-2006)
- **Foreigners**: Between 10,200 and 13,300 foreign migrants
- **Households**: 276,881

**2001-2007 Stats SA data**
- **Population**: 1,050,930
- **Percentage increase (2001-2007)**: 5%
- **Percentage moved in the last 5 years (2002-2007)**: 2%
- **from another province or another country**
- **Recent migrants’ relative productivity**: 4

### Mossel Bay
**Municipality information (no own local study, calculations and updates based on stats SA data)**
- **Population**: 117,840 population (2007)
- **Percentage increase**: 64.8% (from 2001-2007: from 71,499 in 2001 to 117,840 in 2007)
- **Growth rate**: 8.7% growth rate (annual average) bet. 2001 & 2007
- **Foreigners**: Estimated around 124,000 – 125,000 (2010 updates by municipality)

**No locally generated info on migration**

**2001-2007 Stats SA data**
- **Population**: 117,838
- **Percentage increase (2001-2007)**: 68%
- **Percentage moved in the last 5 years (2002-2007)**: 13%
- **from another province or another country**
- **Recent migrants’ relative productivity**: 1.50

### Merafong
**Municipality information (2007 Demographic Study)**
- **Percentage increase**: 36.6% (2001-2007: 210,481 by census 2001 and 287,607 by 2007 own study)

**No locally generated info on migration trends**

**2001-2007 Stats SA data**
- **Population**: 215,865
- **Percentage increase (2001-2007)**: 3%
- **Households**: 88,156 (community survey 2007)
- **Percentage moved in the last 5 years (2002-2007)**: 12%
- **from another province or another country**
- **Recent migrants’ relative productivity**: 0.75
Producing and Using Population Data: Multiplicity, Heterogeneity and Illegitimacy

In spite of the availability of a range of admittedly imperfect sources, many officials did not seem to be aware that they could use them. Perhaps more fundamentally, *even when data were available, many officials felt they could not be used to improve governance or reduce poverty and vulnerability.* Indeed, *there were widespread institutional blocks to the use of available data for planning purposes.* One of the municipalities conducted a demographic study in 2006, which includes population projections to 2020. Despite the availability of relatively reliable data, the director of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) nonetheless stated that:

If you look at the previous edition of the IDP, one would wonder why we have the population of the metro being constant, there are no changes at all. It is because we do not have information.

The municipality’s Chief Financial Officer also believed that no one had done population projections. Either these senior officials were not aware of work their colleagues had done or they had simply ignored the projections. Whatever the reason, the obvious consequence is that population projections were not considered in planning and budgeting.

Elsewhere, officials were convinced that information on migration was entirely unavailable. An official from the Research Unit (City Planning department) in the City of Tshwane even indicated:

There are no mechanisms to know migration in the city. And this is worrying because the natural national population growth is decreasing. It is currently estimated at 1% in cities. So in cities, without migration there is practically no population growth; but still cities do not have accurate information on population movements.

Issues of trust and institutional incentives underlie the reluctance to use locally collected or non-StatsSA data in planning processes. There is also a fair degree of defiance between departments with regard to data produced internally. An Executive Director for Public Health stated:

The sources of data are different and there is no one hub where data is being collected and gathered so that it can be a source for each and everyone. Primary Health goes out and does its own thing. Land does its own thing. Primary Health sometimes does physical counting and gets figures for specific areas and population groups. But there are always disagreements with other departments each saying ‘mine is more accurate’. That’s why we need a single set of figures we can all use.

The Executive Director for Special Programmes in the same municipality agreed:

We need somebody to come up and work through these stats and tell us what we should believe. Otherwise each department uses whatever they think makes better sense to them. But StatsSA is one source not trusted by any department.

Even in the case of large studies commissioned by the Municipality, the lack of trust may be significant. While the Director for Land Use Planning and Management (the home of the study) in one municipality believed that information showing relative population stability was fairly accurate, other directorates and departments believed that the Metro population was growing rapidly, particularly due to migration from rural Eastern Cape. As one official in another municipality reflected, inconsistencies between sources often result in final decisions being based on municipal officials’ perceptions:
We remember in one year, StatsSA gave us figures. In the following year they did updates; they zoomed into one area and they gave double the number of the population of that area in one year. We have been asking how that can be possible. Where did people come from? But with other sources you could see, ok, there is an increase of 2% but not double in one year. StatsSA, however, keeps saying their stuff is true. There is a problem with these population figures because another organisation [he could not remember the name] gave us figures and when we compared the two sets, it wasn’t really a true reflection of the situation in Mossel Bay. So we were not sure what source to trust. What we do: we take StatsSA information and the information from that organisation and then we compare and then we see who has the closest reflection of what we think is happening.

The challenges of collecting, validating and using population statistics are by no means unique or even specific to South Africa: public decision-making across the world often relies on political calculations and the relevant stakeholders’ understanding of social reality as much as facts. Nonetheless, in the absence of reliable and verifiable statistics, the possibility of enormous variation in the assumptions underpinning municipal planning emerges from the impact of personal perspectives and politics. Across South African municipalities, it appears that, at best, decisions and planning are being shaped by officials with a limited empirical knowledge of the population which they serve. At worst, decisions are being made on superficial, impressionistic perceptions or self-serving interests even when data are available.

The state of data collection at national level, and the lack of financial and human resources at local government level, call for a rethinking of planning that better incorporates those uncertainties, acts on improving data collection over the long-term and aims to train staff locally to enable informed projections and trend monitoring.

**Loss of Capacity and Expertise: The Population Research Units**

Part of the challenge of creating and using reliable information is linked to loss of capacity and expertise. In the larger metropolitan areas, this kind of capacity had once been available, but was no longer fully employed. One official confirmed that:

The decision was made to discontinue most of the research unit programmes which resulted in years of good work lost. It is difficult to make municipal leadership and top management to understand how critical research is. The rare reports we compile, such as city profiles, get submitted to and approved by the Council, but we have no idea how they are used for decision making and planning.

The Deputy Director for Metropolitan Planning in the City Planning, Development and Regional Services Department of the same municipality confirmed that research capacity had drastically declined: the research unit went from a peak of 41 researchers in the mid 1990s to only one demographer and one researcher. The respondent believed that the decline was due to the fact that municipal authorities do not understand the value of research. In some instances, the stigma associated with the population planning of the past has led to scepticism over its potential positive, progressive contributions to poverty reduction and social cohesion.

Even where staff turnovers and limited technical expertise were not major problems, interdepartmental coordination and planning for data collection was poor. This resulted in major disagreements between departments on the reliability of data and on mandates over projection. In those municipalities with high levels of staff turnover, or with people serving in ‘acting’ positions, the possibility of accumulating skills and knowledge was particularly limited.
Officials’ Perspectives on Domestic and International Migration

Despite the absence of strong and widely accepted data, almost all municipalities included in this study recognise that they attracted significant numbers of domestic and foreign migrants. Only in one municipality was there disagreement about the importance of migration. Such consensus did not extend to how these flows influenced urban development or poverty. Instead, views included a diverse range of perspectives: a sense that the city should do everything it could to limit migration/transience and promote permanent settlement; fears about the impact of migration for planning and meeting performance targets; concerns over security and the lack of reliable information and mechanisms to collect records of settlement within municipal boundaries; and a sense that however much migration might affect municipalities, it was fundamentally an issue for the Department of Home Affairs or other national bodies to handle. Others explicitly pointed to a (presumed) link between migration and crime (see the discussion of Security later in this report) while some were concerned about international migration and unfair trade competition. Each of these perceptions is explored below.

Migration: Not a local government mandate

There was clearly a general sense that migration management was not a local government mandate but that local government was charged with addressing the results of migration control policies and practices. Although some felt that local government should be considered more in migration policies, there was an undertone of reluctance to tread on turf belonging to other spheres of government. A metro official from the Chief Whip’s Office stated:

At the municipal level, migration is considered a national issue and is not regularly discussed. One or two departments that feel the impact would raise the issue in meetings or address their concerns to their respective departments at provincial and national levels.

In a similar vein, the MMC for Sports and Recreation responded that local government does not discuss, ‘the issue of migration per se but the challenges it causes for service delivery. The Department of Home Affairs is the custodian of the issue of migration.’ Tension between national and local levels was sometimes reported but there was no clear desire to participate more actively in migration policy-making. One official even blatantly dismissed the legitimacy of any local government initiative in this area.

While there may be a realisation from certain executive mayors (for instance in Johannesburg) and from within SALGA\(^\text{10}\) that a local government perspective is crucial in future migration policy developments, this was not echoed in most municipalities. It is therefore likely that only proactive municipalities would support such views and that most would be rather reluctant and perceive it as an additional burden among the wide range of their responsibilities.

\(^{10}\) As expressed at the SALGA National Executive Committee Policy Workshop held in August 2010.
Association with crime and overrepresentation in trade
There were varied perspectives on the relationship between migration and crime. In the municipalities where the association with crime was strongest, the MMC of Community Safety stated:

Foreign migrants are a huge problem. Most come into the country without documents and are difficult to control. We do not know who they are, where they come from or where their destiny is. This makes it difficult to trace them in case it becomes necessary. They are prone to crime as perpetrators or targets and victims. They are also often used to commit crime.

Elsewhere officials expressed no specific association with crime, but rather worried that in-migration was generating tensions over competition for employment, business ownership and housing. Some officials shared the complaint expressed by a Director of Local Economic Development that:

Foreigners are running businesses and it is a threat to us, because on one street there are more foreign business people than local people. Local people put up their products just to realise they are under pressure with pricing of products by foreigners. Then they ask the municipality to intervene. So while, on one hand, we say ‘yes, we are in a free market system’, on other hand we have to protect our people. [...] Somalis and Chinese are flooding the business sector. Their positive impact is that they bring skills, but the problem is that they are not sharing those skills with local people; instead, they bring other migrants in. They are able to identify business gaps and opportunities. They employ locals but do not share their business skills with them, and now local people are scared because they can't do business. We are encouraging the creation of SMMEs by local people to turn around that fear into opportunity.

In addition to being seen as a direct contributor to crime, migration and mobility was often linked to the kind of social fragmentation that can lead to ‘moral decay’, sexual promiscuity and prostitution, and the spread of communicable diseases including, but not limited to, HIV/AIDS.
The Impacts and Drivers of Mobility

Even where officials were cognizant of migration’s potential impacts on their municipalities, they often had a limited understanding of mobility’s multiple forms and varied potential impacts. For many, migration was conceived solely as a once-off move from one place (usually a rural area) to another (typically an urban one). Understood this way, they quickly distinguish between the positive benefits of affluent pensioners and the highly skilled, and the negative and costly effects of less affluent migrants. Here the issue was not only the expanding need for services, but the unpredictability and pace of such movements. In the words of one metro official, ‘Migration affects the quality of service delivery as the municipality is always caught unaware by population movements. This creates permanent service delivery backlogs.’ Similarly, Members of the Mayoral Committees (MMCs) for Housing and Social Development as well as Sports and Recreation complained that they were unable to ‘cope with the influx of people’; giving the example of one township that had ‘grown so fast that the municipality is finding it difficult to accommodate this ever-growing population’.

If there is one common refrain among municipal officials with regards to migration, it is the concern that it will place an undue burden on municipal finances, and undermine their performance targets. There is also a fear that providing for new arrivals will only beget further migration: ‘The more houses you build, the more the influx,’ in the words of one executive director for Corporate Services. Others noted the challenges of providing services for a relatively transient population.

Those who recognise that mobility can mean more than a single, permanent move have additional anxieties over what such transience means for planning. One councillor captured some of these concerns as follows:

[...] Mobility is a challenge. People for instance register on housing waiting lists. When the house is complete, the beneficiary is nowhere to be found; he or she has moved. To reallocate them, we have to go through a lengthy process of deregistration. We cannot plan for this alone as a municipality because service delivery to our people attracts other people. We hope the rural development will help them stay there, work and stay there. But at the same time, we need to attract people with skills.

Beyond this, few officials had a clear idea of how they might address migrants’ livelihoods and service requirements. Without a proactive perspective on what can be done to address human mobility, the common refrain – ‘We can’t cope with the influx and mobility of people’ – threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Despite the ready and repeated concerns that migration would undermine efforts to counter poverty and inequality, this study found no municipal initiative to systematically link mobility to urban economic indicators. Consequently, few officials could speak about what forms of migration (e.g. domestic; foreign; permanent rural-urban migration; seasonal migration; or ongoing movements within a given municipality) were having what effects. Similarly, few could substantiate claims that service provision or economic fortunes encouraged or discouraged movement. Some argued that the fortunes of PetroSA in Mossel Bay or the opening of new mine activities in Merafong had caused large influxes of population, but none of these movements or their impacts had been systematically documented. What was overwhelming clear was a preference for a stable, largely non-mobile population that could be counted, planned for and assisted. The presumed links between mobility and social fragmentation, crime, and disease – as discussed above – only reinforce this preference.
Conclusion

The level of understanding of migration dynamics among municipal officials is limited by the absence of high-quality data, ignorance about the data that do exist, a lack of skills in analysing what is actually available and a range of negative stereotypes attached to transience and international migration. This is unsurprising given how widespread anti-immigrant sentiment is across the South African population.\textsuperscript{11} While we have no quantitative data about how widespread this sentiment exactly is among local government officials, empirical evidence from interviews conducted in these four municipalities confirms the scope and depth of these negative sentiments, at all levels of the local government structures, from mayoral offices to street-level bureaucrats and ward councillors. Despite the fact that these sentiments are not grounded in reliable empirical evidence (relating to the negative impact of internal and international migrants on existing systems), they may nevertheless become self-fulfilling prophecies if not addressed. While these sentiments are clearly not shared by all and are potentially reversible, they call for decisive and urgent action. Beyond this attitudinal issue, there is clearly a need to base policy on an accurate and relatively unbiased understanding of population dynamics (including poverty, mobility, and other dimensions). However, as long as popular sentiment remains so firmly anti-immigrant and anti-migrant, there are strong incentives for municipal officials to avoid appearing ‘pro-migrant.’ This popular pressure combined with the multiple factors (administrative and capacity-related) identified in this report acts as a strong hindrance for the most enlightened sections of South African local government to explore policy reform.

This report makes a strong case for initiatives to improve migration planning to go beyond technical measures related to the collection and analysis of better data. The report points to specific areas for intervention that range precisely from better data collection and analysis mechanisms, to improvements within municipalities in terms of population planning coordination, reforms of the resource allocation system and inter-governmental coordination. As for perceptions expressed by local government officials, they are certainly key to promoting the kind of constructive, innovative and forward-looking attitude to mobility management that is necessary to capacitate this corps of municipal officials and modernise their collective data collection and planning skills. This requires intervention of a different nature but that should be conducted in parallel with the other areas identified previously.

\textsuperscript{11} For more information on anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa and its development over the past decade, see Crush 2008.
Chapter Three: Consultation, Planning and Budgeting

This section explains why – apart from the lack of data – planning processes have rarely included migration or other population dynamics. It emphasises how the nature of South African planning and budgeting works against forward-looking planning that considers population dynamics. It shows how migration is viewed in an ambivalent way: both as a default strategy to channel people into certain areas and as an obstacle to planning and budgeting, particularly for the poor. It concludes that the fora and incentives for intergovernmental planning and budgeting are either absent or stifled by institutional configurations and poor communication.

Consultation

Participatory planning emerged in the post-apartheid dispensation as a way of realising democratic transformation at the local level. In South Africa, this approach to planning was central to the transformation policy and was highlighted as a principle in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme, in which the poor and marginalised were involved in the earliest phases of planning processes by directly expressing their interests and needs. It was subsequently incorporated into the new legislative and policy framework on local government through the White Paper on Local Government (1998), which recognised participatory governance and inclusiveness as among the central objectives of municipal institutions. Later, it the approach was reflected in the Municipal Systems Act (2000), which provides for accommodating the needs of ‘marginalised groups’. It currently constitutes the basis for the preparation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), five-year plans which flag the main directions for municipalities to attain the development goals they have set for themselves.

One of this study’s most important findings is that the emphasis on participatory planning has unwittingly created incentives for excluding the interests of migrants, discouraging officials from including them in forward planning. A number of shortcomings, particularly in terms of communities’ actual technical empowerment, have been highlighted by others (see, for example, Bremner 1998: 118). Not only do these shortcomings seem to fuel local power struggles and leadership tensions, but it has resulted in what might be seen as ‘backward-looking programming’. People’s self-assessments of their public service needs are rarely balanced by objective empirical evidence, both for the reasons stated in the previous section, and due to lack of technical knowledge. The needs expressed through consultation are then filtered to select those that meet political imperatives and capacities. What is ultimately reflected in IDP documents consequently represents the needs of only those sections of the poor population that accessed consultation forums at one specific moment in time. In addition, this limited array of needs is articulated in terms of the political interests and priorities of office bearers. Moreover, communities rarely have the capacity to project demographic trends, and are unlikely to ask municipalities to dedicate resources to potential future residents over their own acute sense of immediate need. Given public attitudes towards migrants, and a limited knowledge of migration dynamics, officials are unlikely to insist that resources be dedicated to an unpopular group of potential residents.

A second limitation of participatory planning lies in the de facto exclusion of migrants (both domestic and international) and of migration issues from public consultations for planning purposes. In general, outsiders from the communities studied were not invited to participate in Community Policing Forums (there were exceptions in parts of Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay), Stakeholders’ Forums, Residents’ Associations, or meetings held by local ward councillors. While there was seldom any overt prohibition on such participation, almost all of the officials and community members interviewed indicated an almost total absence of foreigners and recent migrants in these kinds of fora. It must be noted, however, that this is not the case everywhere. The City of Johannesburg, for instance, has launched a number of initiatives to foster and encourage migrants’ participation in dialogue platforms (for instance, the Migrant Helpdesk, created in April 2007, and
the Johannesburg Migrants’ Advisory Committee (JMAC), launched in 2010). This has been preceded by initiatives at the ward level, such as a migrant neighbourhood in Yeoville where the Stakeholders’ Forum has included migrants’ organisations for several years already. While these initiatives are laudable, they are limited to a few municipalities. Moreover, it is as yet unclear how exactly they will associate migrants with planning at community level, where exclusion mechanisms are often implicit and pernicious.

Planning
A close examination of municipalities’ IDPs reflected little mainstreaming of population dynamics into planning processes. In most cases, demographics were simply mentioned as an element of background, not as the basis for development plans. The lack of reliable information, as described in the previous chapter, is not the only reason for such bounded planning. Municipal officials have an ambivalent approach to population information: they consider it useful for the current management of development programmes and for targeting ‘poverty pockets,’ but they are unable to use it to garner the financial support they need for future investment. In some instances, they expressed concern that too much data might only highlight the shortcomings of what they knew were inadequate interventions given the scope of demand.

The lack of forward planning affects all municipal residents, yet future arrivals and current migrants occupied a particularly ambivalent space in officials’ vision.

While officials recognised that not all migration resulted in permanent settlement, they did not seem to have considered that

1) the municipality’s services and employment characteristics may not be conducive to permanent settlement;
2) temporary migration may be systematic and predictable; or
3) the municipality might develop differentiated (and not necessarily more costly) approaches to service delivery that accommodate the different expectations of long- and short-term residents.

In practice, planning seemed to be oriented towards targets that clearly favoured permanent residents over temporary ones. In part this was due to negative preconceptions about transient populations, but it was probably more a consequence of available instruments and bureaucratic rigidity and comfort in planning for service allocation. A town planner explained:

The reason is not to exclude migrants. It is merely focusing on permanent residents first. It is difficult to cater for people who are highly mobile while still dealing with permanent residents at the same time, as they often do not require the same strategies.

Similar preferences to prioritise ‘our own’ long-term residents were expressed elsewhere in other municipalities. The language of preference was sometimes explicit and sometimes couched beneath the pretext of assisting ‘registered ratepayers.’ Nonetheless, the priorities were clear.

This widespread preference for long-term residents seemed to be shared across party political divides, and commonly reflected in approached to informal settlements, which are the most visible manifestation of immigration. In Mossel Bay, for instance, the municipality has adopted a proactive line against informal settlements based on systematic dismantling and eviction in order to discourage newcomers. In another municipality, a study had been commissioned and a unit created in the Community Safety Department to retard the expansion of informal settlements, a position which was much criticised by the political opposition. The Strategy Support Executive explained the municipality’s approach as follows:
What we are trying to do is to discourage people from coming. As far as squatting is concerned, we have people who remove those structures. Other than that there is nothing else you can do because you do not have funds, you do not have land available. You can only try to discourage people as much as possible”.

At least one other Metro has developed a parallel approach. In two of the municipalities, officials did not indicate specific services for the removal of squatter camps but expressed the same negative attitude with regards to their ‘mushrooming’. In Cape Town, there have been similar efforts to manage the city’s growing population, although the language used reflects a level of political sophistication and nuance not seen in the smaller municipalities. As in Johannesburg, efforts to maintain the urban edge or protect sensitive environmental resources often provide the justification for ‘decanting’ recently arrived and mobile populations.

**Budgeting**

Current mentalities and modalities of planning have at least two significant implications for the budgeting processes:

1. Efforts to address the existing needs of permanent residents leads financial planners to generally overlook population and migration trends, despite the fact that future residents will, ultimately, demand resources and interventions;
2. Where there are significant efforts to ‘forward plan’, they are largely unsupported by the current system of resource allocation to local government through the Local Government Equitable Share.

**Lack of Budgetary Support for Forward-Planning**

The strict reliance on 2001 Census data (and subsequent national averages of population growth rates), and the difficulty of generating universally accepted interim data, has undermined municipalities’ ability to calculate current demographic realities and trends. This is clearly illustrated in the following statement by a Director of Town Planning:

“We know that we have the highest population in the district; bigger than George, but they are given more money than us. Everyone is aware that Mossel Bay is the largest town in Eden District Municipality, but allocations for housing and MIA grant are not related to population figures.

There is therefore no incentive for municipal officials to be forward-looking in their planning and budgeting, since they are compelled to work from figures that do not correspond with their municipalities’ changing demographic composition. Moreover, municipalities are generally unable to use studies they have commissioned or other data sources to influence their budget allocation. The Chief Financial Officer in another municipality thus explains:

I was recently faced with a question of why we can’t put in a proposal to the national treasury to increase our equitable share to support poor people in the municipality, as things have changed from the baseline data of 2001. Now the issue is that I can’t put a submission like that because the 2001 census data was used to calculate the equitable share. Equitable Share allocations for every municipality have been using the same information. It is therefore difficult to go as an independent municipality and request a review of individual municipalities. Unless you have information for the entire country, for all municipalities such reviews will remain difficult."
It is not only the absence of a complete and recognised set of updated municipal figures that is the challenge, but also the degree to which these figures can highlight the needs of an ‘indigent’ population. In only one municipality, the Town Planner considered this as a serious problem because of an increasing number of grant beneficiaries and thus an increasing number of indigent people for which the municipality was not receiving funding. A similar objection to Treasury’s basis for calculation was expressed in the Chief Financial Officer of one municipality:

Current figures are said to be stagnant, but I disagree. People are moving into the city in numbers judging from growing needs and growing consumption of services. There is a lot of urbanisation taking place; so people are coming to us and not moving away from us. The majority of them come from rural areas. Unfortunately they do not migrate into affluent areas, they go into poor areas and that has a huge impact on my operating budget because we have a policy called Assistance to the Poor (ATTP) for all poor people and households. Households with a monthly income of no more than R2030 qualify for ATTP. The clear implication is that poor households multiply with urbanisation, while operating budgets remain stagnant.

There was a general consensus among officials over inadequacies in the LGES mode of calculation, and a sense of powerlessness in redressing inaccurate population estimates. By and large, respondents pointed to the need for much more regular assessments of municipalities’ populations, particularly in their more mobile and indigent strata, which often overlapped. The increasing gap between the numbers in need and the numbers receiving benefits was not the only concern highlighted as having potential to exacerbate already high social tensions. In addition, the rigidity of the system, and the absence of efficient channels of dialogue for the reform of calculation modes, seemed to discourage many from taking the initiative. The principle of equity, in terms of national standards of calculation, at the heart of the LGES system, was not in itself questioned, but its lack of flexibility and adaptation over time were criticised.

**Conclusion**
Consulting, planning and budgeting processes entail challenges linked to the poor quality of population data, as highlighted in Chapter Two. However, planning failures cannot be attributed to data paucities alone. They are also tied to shortcomings in the applicable governing frameworks. The way participatory planning is currently conducted within the municipalities studied is not conducive to outsiders’ participation, and does not encourage forward-looking planning in which populations’ immediate needs would be balanced with dynamic projections over time. Instead, authorities almost invariably perceive migration and mobility as a challenge to ‘efficient’
planning, with a preference for permanent residents expressed across municipalities, sometimes justifying proactive anti-squatter policies. The whole LGES system similarly serves to discourage the incorporation of transient communities, as municipalities are not supported if they wish to plan for rapid or highly localised population changes that have not been captured in a national census. Not only are officials acutely aware of these inadequacies, but they also expressed a sense of powerlessness in amending the existing system. Intergovernmental cooperation is lacking in many respects with regards to decisions concerning foreign migrants and their access to certain rights.
Since 2009, the President of South Africa has placed a renewed emphasis on social cohesion, while the police and others have redoubled their efforts to fight criminality and violence in South African communities. Although not explicitly about migration, these two imperatives nonetheless bring issues of mobility and security into sharp relief. A concrete definition of social cohesion is not included in government policy, but most would agree that it includes overcoming a range of deeply ingrained and emerging forms of intolerance and bias: managing the tensions of diverse and diversifying communities in systematic and equitable ways (see Cloete and Kotze 2009). Doing so successfully is expected to produce greater social equity and justice, while limiting the opportunities for and exercise of criminality and socially destructive behaviours, including ‘xenophobic’ violence. National institutional frameworks, policy priorities, and incentives are important in shaping conflicts and preventing them, but the majority of tensions manifest themselves and must be addressed within specific municipalities.

This chapter offer a three-fold approach to dealing with identity- or community-based tensions and migration-related security in South African municipalities. This approach is based on observations made during the course of the study, including:

- The limited degree to which demands for social cohesion have been translated into particular programmes or initiatives to resolve real and potential tensions among the municipalities’ residents; and
- Biased practices by the police, officials, and other leaders (elected and otherwise) in relation to security and conflict resolution.

The findings in these respects are discussed below, and the chapter concludes with a recommended approach to dealing with issues of social cohesion.

**Understanding and Reframing Social Cohesion**

The first step in addressing migration-related tensions and the possibility of violence is to identify and address the roots of conflict and discrimination. As noted elsewhere in this report, many officials understand managing or addressing migration as something primarily associated with movement across South Africa’s international borders. As such, mobility and its consequences are typically deemed a national competence that affects municipalities but falls largely outside their mandates. In almost all cases, officials’ focus is more on issues that current electorates are pressurising them about, such as housing and water. Where population change and movement within municipalities is seen as posing locally salient challenges, these are typically framed in terms of conflicts due to race and inequality, not nationality, ethnicity, or mobility. When pushed, authorities recognise that people’s origins could become a flashpoint for conflict, typically in relation to access to public services, resources and employment. Local government officials typically downplay the significance of discriminatory attitudes as enablers for other forms of conflict. Reflecting national political commitment, they often insist that their constituency is not intolerant or xenophobic, per se, but are rather driven towards xenophobic statements and acts by material circumstances or criminal manipulation (See Landau 2010). In the words of the Acting Executive Director for Safety and Security in one Metro, past attacks were ‘never necessarily a xenophobia thing.’

There has been a gradual recognition at a senior leadership level, in both national and local government, that xenophobia and other forms of intolerance are potentially explosive and damaging forces within communities. There has been a proliferation of symbolic and material efforts to address diversity, particularly, xenophobia.
In one municipality, this concern has translated into an *ad hoc* task team of officials and an assertion by the office of the speaker that xenophobia is ‘continuously being addressed in various arenas.’ Johannesburg’s Migration Advisory Committee (JMAC), established by the Mayor in the wake of the 2008 xenophobic attacks, provides an additional example. In Tshwane, a series of committees were also established in the wake of the 2008 violence.

The launching of committees and cultural events are important steps in mainstreaming concerns over diversity into municipalities’ operations. However, the research found little evidence of substantive engagement around these issues. Apart from an assortment of visible activities such as soccer tournaments, cultural events, and speeches, many of the efforts across a range of municipalities have had limited programmatic impact. In one of the metros, the committee quickly fell apart before launching any substantive programmatic interventions. In another metro, a Migrant Help Desk, established long before the 2008 attacks, provides some information and coordination around migration and xenophobia, but has been unable to drive a mainstreamed approach across the municipality. In one other local municipality, few people apart from those involved in the task team could identify any programmes that had been undertaken under its authority. Indeed, across the municipalities, few officials could point to specific initiatives or programmatic changes aimed at addressing tensions related to migration or diversity. To further illustrate the limited impacts of these initiatives, many police and local officials continue to deny their responsibility for managing tensions and planning around migration.

Apart from regularly denying responsibility for managing it, part of the challenge municipalities face in addressing issues of social cohesion and xenophobia is their limited understanding of its roots and impacts. Many continue to describe xenophobia as something that happened in 2008 and has since subsided, much like a surprising and particularly fierce thunderstorm. In one of the smaller municipalities, officials reported that locals were simply ‘caught up in national events…copying what they saw on TV,’ thus denying any local tensions. Others describe it as opportunism. The only significant exception to this perspective was in Merafong, where the Chief Whip recognised that ‘Shangaan speakers’ (a category likely to include both Mozambicans and South Africans) were chased out of Khutsong as early as 2000. But even in Khutsong, authorities felt that they were relatively helpless in shaping the attitudes behind such violence. Instead they preferred to focus on the law enforcement issues that stem from these attitudes. While xenophobic violence is now recognised as a problem (and a potentially recurrent one); the approach to it is still rooted largely in law enforcement and can, as such, only be reactive.

Given widespread popular sentiments linking migration (including domestic migration, but especially cross-border movements) with criminality, senior police officers and officials have widely divergent views on the relationship between mobility and insecurity. In one metro there was a widespread perception that (a) migration was a major force shaping the city and (b) that migrants were implicated in a wide range of criminal activities. Similarly, in a smaller municipality, the Chairperson of Technical Services – one of the four members of the Mayoral Committee – argued that, ‘...it’s a known fact: they come and they buy a house for R700, while original owners go and stay under plastic bags again. Some of these houses have been used for drug retailing’. Throughout the interviews, Nigerians (a category that indiscriminately includes all Anglophone West Africans) are particularly demonised, although Zimbabweans and Mozambicans also feature prominently. Elsewhere, police expressed concern that people who come and go from a given location – usually domestic migrants in this case – can easily evade police observation and arrest. This was particularly pronounced in Merafong, where representatives from SAPS and private security both argued that people travelled from Johannesburg and Soweto to commit crimes.

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12 See Crush and Williams 2003; Landau and Monson 2008.
Others explained that foreign criminals slip through the net because they have not been adequately fingerprinted or registered. The same can be said for most South Africans, although it is also unclear that such a register would be particularly useful in fighting crime.

While officials and police officers may vary in the degree to which they explicitly link migration and insecurity, almost all link unregulated population movement and settlement to the crime within their communities. If it is not migrants, per se, that are the problem, it is uncontrolled housing and settlement patterns, the inability to organise and register the population, and the inability of the city to keep up with the infrastructure needed to reach into townships and informal settlements. Some cite the poor quality of education and limited opportunities for schooling as an indirect cause of conflict and criminality. As almost all of these factors are linked to population dynamics, migration remains a spectre hiding just beneath the surface. What few officials seem to explicitly recognise is that the negative outcomes they observe are by no means predetermined. Rather, the ineffective management of population growth has helped heighten precisely the tensions over housing and resources that can lead to intergroup conflict.

Structures and Practices
As noted earlier, officials have done little to explicitly manage the tensions and insecurity associated with population mobility. However, there are a range of practices by the police and others that suggest a strong bias against new arrivals. In many municipalities, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has arrested and detained non-nationals and other suspect outsiders. Under the guise of crime control, the police in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and a number of other municipalities spend disproportionate amounts of their time tracking undocumented migrants (see Vigneswaran & Duponchel 2009). Even where SAPS is not directly involved, someone often steps in to carry out the same function. In Nelson Mandela Bay, this has taken the form of the Port of Entry police. In Mossel Bay, complaints about drug trading or other illegal activities tended to result in a strategy of once-off raids rather than ongoing targeting of non-nationals and outsiders. However, even in these raids, the first ports of call for officers included foreign-owned shops, shacks, and homes. While such highly visible initiatives surely build the credibility of law enforcers among some residents, it also reinforces the perception that foreigners are predisposed to criminal behaviours (see Crush and Williams 2002).

While it is easy to condemn the bias and harassment associated with these raids, it is important to understand the structural and political imperatives that motivate these and other similar behaviours. Across the municipalities, SAPS officials were aware that they were not satisfying residents’ demands for justice and security. In almost all the municipalities, citizens expressed frustration that there was little follow-up or investigation on criminal activity, besides occasional arbitrary raids. One officer noted that community members in KwaNongqaba (Mossel Bay) now take it upon themselves to go to court when suspects are arrested. Once there, they warn the judge to keep the suspect in custody, otherwise they will face justice on the street. Elsewhere, the loss of faith in official systems has encouraged various forms of vigilante activity or mob justice. This is particularly evident in Walmer Township (Nelson Mandela Bay) and in Soshanguve (Tshwane). Given that many local residents see South African and foreign migrants as responsible for everything from petty crime to drug trafficking and murder, these vigilante groups tend to target outsiders.

While policing and vigilantism often target foreigners and other outsiders, there have also been instances where they have worked to protect foreigners from xenophobic attacks. The Gqebega Trust in Nelson Mandela Bay is one such initiative. The trust initially emerged, as have many similar efforts, to combat crime. Rather than simply organise to push out the Zimbabweans who were largely presumed to be behind problems in Walmer Township, the group organised, under strong and consistent leadership, to investigate criminal acts and to find out what had happened. Working with police and private security to collect and disseminate information, the
trust has established itself as an important conduit and source of social capital. The trust has demonstrated that a credible organisation and leader that can speak against prevailing xenophobic sentiments can be a powerful tool for promoting cohesion.

The lack of population planning discussed elsewhere in this report gives rise to a particular challenge for the police. The densely occupied territories within a given municipality – particularly municipalities that include significant rural areas – result in a greater area and number of people for which police are responsible. Moreover, the growth of cities also means overseeing a range of housing types, linguistic groups, and leadership structures. In some places, the relatively unplanned expansion of the municipal footprint means that people are now living in areas without good transport infrastructure and without the kinds of maps that would facilitate navigation and patrols. Without additional financial support or planning, the police often find themselves ‘thin on the ground’ and unable to fully comprehend or establish a presence within the growing diversity around them. According to a communication officer at KwaNonqaba in Mossel Bay, it takes years for SAPS to ‘update’ its resources at police stations, meaning that ‘it will be impossible to match the need’.

It is not only efforts to gain popular legitimacy that encourage the police to behave in arbitrary or overly assertive ways with regards to informal settlers or migrants. In one municipality, for example, the police complained that pressure comes from Parliament for the police to ‘perform’. In practice, this translates into policies around arrest and other benchmarks that allow individual stations or commands to demonstrate their effectiveness. Consequently, the police admit that they arrest people just to achieve the applicable quota. In Johannesburg and elsewhere, these arrests disproportionately target non-nationals, who are less likely to have identity documents or business licenses.

Community policing forums play an important role in structuring community relations, particularly on contentious issues of crime and security. In a number of places, their potential is well recognised by both the police and citizens. However, lack of state resources means that their operations rely entirely on support from community members. The consequence of this is that they become vulnerable to serving the individual interests of those that are able and ready to offer resources.

We must also recognise that municipal officials are not the only actors working to improve the management of migration, particularly regarding accusations of criminality and initiatives to address it. Along with community organisations and vigilante groups, any effort to promote security and cohesion must incorporate private companies, large and small. As a leader from Business against Crime (BAC) in Nelson Mandela Bay reports,
we’ve got 10,000 armed private security guards in the city . . . and they don’t talk to each other, because they see each other as competition.’ Similarly, they rarely engage with either metro police or SAPS, often for precisely the same reasons – or because they do not wish to reveal their quasi-legal strategies to the police.

Obstacles to social cohesion are not limited to the police and security agents. In many instances, new arrivals are largely excluded from community leadership structures. In some cases, people seem to be explicitly excluded – told that they are not eligible to attend meetings organised by local CPFs or as part of the municipality’s integrated development planning. If municipalities are unable to find ways of opening avenues for new arrivals to actively participate in such meeting, they help reinforce a sense of difference and boundaries between groups. Moreover, they limit the information they would otherwise be able to collect from this constituency. Beyond that, the continued exclusion of new arrivals may foster a sense of transience that limits social and material investment in the areas in which they live. Providing a sense that new arrivals can influence the future of their residential municipalities can help create incentives for involvement and such investments.

Conclusions
Tensions related to migration are likely to remain a dangerous trait in municipalities across South Africa (see Strategy and Tactics 2010). While there is a slow recognition of the need to address these tensions, current conceptualisation and planning processes are likely to maintain or exacerbate current conditions. As noted throughout this report, migration is generally not considered in municipal planning processes. Initiatives to promote social cohesion have been short lived and largely superficial.

To be effective, municipalities must overcome a dual challenge related to limited causal regress in terms of discrimination and planning. To date, xenophobia and discrimination have usually been considered only when they manifest themselves in violence, exclusion or criminality. In most instances, authorities deny the possibility that their communities are generally exclusory. Similarly, they typically deny that their services and resource allocation systems may unintentionally result in discriminatory allocations. Consequently, the proposed solutions are typically apolitical: rooted in improved law enforcement practices rather than a broader shift in political discourse and understandings of urban citizenship. Rather than excluding new arrivals from broader deliberative structures, there is a need to shift incentives for the police, community policing forums and other community structures to become more inclusive.

Discussions of crime face a similarly causal shortcoming. Although a few authorities and officers suggest that controlling migration – particularly of West Africans – would help to address crime, most root insecurity in economic disparities and a shortage of infrastructure: roads, schools, houses, and the like. As these paucities are firmly rooted in population dynamics, including natural growth and migration, any effective solution to crime must consider and plan for such dynamics across local and other government departments.

A Three-Stranded Approach
Addressing issues of identity- or community-based tensions and migration-related security in South African municipalities will therefore require a three-stranded approach. As there is no ‘third force’ or national syndicate to be broken, these processes must be managed locally, albeit within national planning and policy frameworks. The first step in doing so will require a shift in mindset – a change in attitudes towards migration among civic and community leaders that lends credence and practical political support to broader calls for cohesion and tolerance. Only by curbing explicit and implicit accusations against migrants will it be possible to create communities founded on principles of tolerance and inclusion.
The second aspect of a successful solution will be a shift in structural incentives that currently discourage initiatives that bridge differences among various groups living within a single municipality or within particular parts of a given municipality. For example, the very legitimacy of police within communities may depend on their behaving in ways that explicitly discriminate against or neglect the rights and welfare of less popular sub-groups. As long as biases remain strong, the police will continue to find incentives for treating migration – international and domestic – as a threat to security even, when they well know that it is not.

Lastly, there is a need to reconsider the role of statutorily mandated bodies like Community Policing Forums in fostering inclusion and discouraging disunity and conflict. In many instances, these bodies are effectively ‘captured’ by those within communities who possess exclusionary ambitions. When these conditions are in place, local-level interventions can be considered. These will include considering the functions of roles and agencies that are formally or informally charged with managing tensions and promoting cohesion among diverse and mobile groups.
Recommendations

Migration is a global phenomenon and South Africa is not immune to its effects. Failure to proactively address migration and other forms of human mobility will yield undesired consequences for all: social fragmentation, economic exclusion, poor planning, and the continued possibility of violence. If properly managed, domestic migration can bring people closer to services, enrich the labour market, and open important opportunities for poverty reduction. Similarly, international migration need not lead to conflict and tensions, but can help to provide needed skills and entrepreneurial energy, while boosting regional trade and integration and helping to facilitate post-conflict reconstruction in international migrants’ countries of origin.

Migration and other forms of human mobility are by definition deeply spatialised processes. People move from one specific place to another, either within a municipality or into another municipality. As such, local government has a significant role to play to effectively manage migration. Initiatives to guide municipalities on how to proceed in developing and implementing policies and strategies to that effect should therefore be developed.

Effectively countering poverty in municipalities affected by varied forms of human mobility means effectively recognising migration dynamics and their effects on poverty and social cohesion. More migration does not necessarily equal fewer resources for long-term residents. In order to progressively addressing the relationships among these variables means first understanding the strengths and limitations of existing formal and informal institutions, and strengthening those capable of fostering participation, conflict resolution, and service delivery. As such, migration policy must be managed as a strategic planning and development issue, rather than being viewed negatively as a problem that needs to be reversed. This also includes differentiating between foreign and domestic migrants, both of which pose significant but different sets of challenges.

South Africa needs an immigration policy that promotes its goals of regional integration, counter poverty, social justice and human rights. This means developing appropriate means for people to enter the country legally, supported by appropriate documentation. The country must find ways to manage migrants in ways that are humane and promote the legal migration of people who wish to cross the border. Rigid border controls and anti-migration policies do not always protect the labour market. Rather, such efforts often heighten corruption and human rights abuse, as experienced elsewhere in the world. Similarly, ongoing raids and deportations do little to control absolute numbers. Rather, they inhibit investment while promoting social fragmentation and stigmatisation. If the goal is to better regulate the labour market, the government must penalise employers who violate immigration and labour laws. National migration policy should also be drafted in relation to local government’s mandate, as the spatialised effects of both documented and undocumented migration are primarily felt by municipalities. Considering the political economy of border towns and urban areas specifically affected by hyper-mobility, policy-making could avoid reproducing the current over-simplistic approach to control, documentation and deportation. As they stand, current national migration policy and legal frameworks offer very little space for engagement with local government. Including organised local government in the national migration policy reform process and further monitoring and supporting its active input could address this need.

See Wayne Cornelius on the US border (c. 2001), reports of drowning in the Mediterranean.
The consistent and confusing overlaps and gaps in service delivery mandates related to the management of mobile populations is one of this study’s key findings. While border control and the provision of documentation are undeniably national competencies, the nature of their implementation impacts the range of benefits and rights individuals may enjoy at their place of residence or work. Undocumented migrants or unregistered South Africans, especially in informal settlements, pose a specific challenge for municipalities. The illegality of their stay in the country or the informality of their residence in a locality should not deprive them of certain basic rights.

While there are good reasons for providing investments in rural areas, the structure of the current global economy privileges life in urban areas. Given the continued movements of people into and through cities, and the relatively high fertility rates of those already living in South Africa’s urban areas, authorities must begin planning for rapid growth in many of the country’s cities and larger towns. Elsewhere, the movement of people is likely to denude the labour force and create a disproportionately high demand for social services. Effective management of these processes will mean improving the interface and relationships between urban and rural municipalities. Spatial planning must explicitly include population dynamics and scenarios in determining targets and monitoring standards.

The following are a few potential areas of intervention towards effectively managing migration and urbanisation:

- Data collection and management;
- Use of Population Data for Policy, Planning and Budgeting;
- Improved Coordination;
- Border management;
- Manage migration and urbanisation as an inevitable global phenomenon;
- Building the capacity for ongoing research, monitoring, and projections.

**Data Collection**

There is a need to rethink the data collection system and the interface between municipalities, provinces and national agencies such as Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), to ensure that:

- A degree of standardisation at national, provincial and municipal level is maintained to allow comparability of data;
- Data collection methods at municipal level are agreed upon, familiar, and considered to be legitimate, useful and reliable by all stakeholders;
- Data builds up into longitudinal data bases informing municipalities on trends over time;
- Management of migration and migrant communities is led by staff that has been trained in the management and use of data, and on related migration issues;
- StatsSA collects data which is disaggregated better at the local level. This should include better coordination with municipalities and other data collection agencies.

**Use of Population Data for Policy, Planning and Budgeting**

- Population (including migration) dynamics should be mainstreamed into IDPs, with particular emphasis on social cohesion, economic growth, safety and security. IDPs should cater for highly mobile populations wherever necessary, and use evidence in a more balanced way for policy formation. The use of population data for policy and planning must include participatory planning processes and spatial planning, and must find expression in both Spatial Development Frameworks and IDPs;
• Review budgeting processes, including the Local Government Equitable Share (LGES) Allocation to include forward-looking population dynamics. Ensure that LGES allows for more regular population re-assessments, including assessments of changes in the indigent population and amendments of revenue allocations.

Improved Co-ordination

• Improve coordination of all relevant partners at national, provincial and local levels, towards a more effective management of migration. These include all spheres of government, civil society, private sector, research agencies, and academic institutions;
• Facilitate the institutionalisation of a local government response to migration in order to improve communication and coordination between municipalities and migrant communities. This includes the establishment of dedicated capacity to deal with migration, such as Migrant Desks;
• Establish a migration policy think tank to aid in re-thinking decision-making and implementation mandates with regard to mobile populations. The City of Johannesburg and City of Cape Town are currently experimenting with ‘City Labs’ that bring together academics, civil society, and municipal officials in ongoing thematic discussions.

Migration Policy and Border Management

• South Africa needs an immigration policy that promotes its goals of regional integration, counter-poverty, social justice and human rights. This means developing appropriate means for people to enter the country legally and with appropriate documentation. Considering that South Africa, like all other migrant receiving countries, cannot completely seal its borders, it must find ways to manage cross-border mobility in ways that are humane and promote the legal migration of people who wish to cross;
• If improved regulation of the labour market is required, the government should consider sanctions against employers who violate immigration and labour laws and more regularly inspection of workplaces to ensure that the basic conditions of labour are being upheld;
• Reforms in migration policy should be carried out in collaboration with municipalities. Municipalities should also find ways of formulating and articulating their interests with regard to immigration policy and practice.

Continuous Research and Development

Support ongoing research to enhance the understanding and management of migration. The following additional areas of research have been proposed:

• Migration and access to services in order to better understand how (if at all) long-term vulnerable groups move out of poverty;
• Qualitative research to determine the relationships between mobility within or between cities and access to employment, labour and services;
• Qualitative studies on the role played by corporate social responsibility programmes carried out by companies relying on migrant labour.
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MRC/Wits Rural Public Health and Health Transitions Research Unit (Agincourt), School of Public Health, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.


